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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Is testimony of an uncharged rape admissible under California Evidence Code § 1101
(West 1989) to address a rape defendant's intent when the defendant admits engaging in
intercourse and only raises the defense of actual consent and when the defendant and the
prosecuting witness proffer irreconcilable accounts of the events?
2. Even if testimony of an uncharged rape is admissible to address a material issue, do the
facts in the uncharged rape exhibit a high degree of common features with the facts in the
instant case to prove by direct inference the defendant's intent or common scheme or plan?
3. If the uncharged rape is relevant to address a material issue, did the trial court abuse its
discretion by admitting the evidence because the probative value of the evidence did not
substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect?
4. Did the trial court’s erroneous decision to admit the Michigan rape into evidence
constitute reversible error?
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)
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)

)
)
)
)

V.
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)
)
)
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PETITIONER’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court
of the State of California, County of Orange
The Honorable Leonard H. McBride, Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, Division 'nirec
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
Petitioner, Jason Michael Balcom, was charged with forcible rape, robbeiy, burglary,
and the use of a firearm in the commission of these offenses, (C.T. 37-38.) Although he was
convicted of robbery, the jury did not reach a verdict on the counts of forcible rape, burglary,
and the charge relating to the use of a firearm. (CT. 142, 146.) A second trial was held on
the charges of forcible rape and the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense.
In the second trial, the trial court admitted evidence of a Michigan rape for which the
defendant had been convicted. (C.T. 154-57.) Defense counsel objected on the grounds that
1

Balcom's intent was not a material issue since Balcom only raised the defense of actual
consent and admitted having sex with the prosecuting witness. (CT. 677: 7-13.) The court
held that the evidence was relevant to address the defendant’s intent stating that intent is
always an issue in a rape case since "it is part of the charge against the will Of the person **
(R.T. 677:19-21.) Petitioner was found guilty of forcible rape, a violation of Cat Penal Code
section 261 (West 1989). (CT. 229.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the defendant’s intent was a material issue
and that the Michigan rape was relevant to prove intent People v. Balcom. 1 Cal.App.4th
354, 364 (1991). Moreover, it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
that the probative value of the Michigan rape substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect
Id at 365. On January 30, 1992, this Court granted Balcom’s petition for review.
Statement of the Facts
The Defendant’s Case

Approximately eleven days prior to the alleged rape, Balcom accompanied his friend
Charles Tate to Ms. B.’s apartment complex on 2511 Sunflower St to visit Jace Ovcrcash,
Ms, B.’s housemate. When they arrived, Ovcrcash opened the door and invited them in. Ms.
B. was the only other person home. (R.T. 1117:13-26; 1118:1-3.) While Overcash and Tate
went into another room to discuss a personal matter, Balcom and Ms. B. chatted in the living
room for approximately twenty minutes before Tate returned. (R.T. 1119:13-23.)
On July 22. 1989, Balcom again accompanied Tate to find Ovcrcash because Tate was
supposed to deUver drugs to him. (R.T. 1121:1.) Both men went to Ovcrcash’s apartment in
the evening where they found him and Ms. B. (R.T. 1121:12-21.) After a brief visit, all of
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the occupants left the apartment Ms. B. told Balcom that she had to go to her car to get
something. They all walked to Tate’s car, and Tate and Ovcrcash entered the car and drove
away. Balcom and Ms. B. then walked to Ms. B.’s car and took a roundabout path back to
thF apartment (R.T. 1122-1124.)

~

At the apartment Balcom and Ms. B. sat and conversed for about forty-five minutes
until Overcash and Tate returned (R.T. 1124:21-26.) At this time Oveicash expressed a
desire to buy a gold rope chain that Balcom was wearing for $250. (R.T. 1125:21-26; 1126:12.) Because Overcash did not have the money, he stated he would pay Balcom the following
day along with the money he owed Tate. (R.T. 1126:6-14.) Tate later asked Balcom to pick
up the money Ovcrcash owed him the following day; Balcom agreed (R.T. 1127:16-17.)
Around noon the next day, Balcom knocked on Ms. B. and Overcash’s door. (R.T.
1128:22-23.) When there was no answer, he spent the day at the nearby Southcoast Plaza
visiting friends and watching movies. (R,T. 1129:1-6.) In the evening, he returned to Ms.
B.’s apartment where Ms. B. greeted and invited him in. He explained his reason for the
visit, and she told him that Overcash would return shortly. (R.T. 1129:22-26; 1130:1-11.)
While waiting for Ovcrcash, the two conversed and eventually went into the bedroom.
Subsequently, Balcom and Ms. B. engaged in foreplay and consensual sexual intercourse.
(R.T. 1130:13-23.)
After intercourse, Balcom asked Ms. B. where Ovcrcash was. (R,T. 1131:1-3.) She
told him that Ovcrcash did not intend to return or pay Balcom the money he owed him, and
Balcom became very upset (R.T. 1131:11-15.) Because he assumed that "she was in it with
Mr. Ovcrcash." he demanded the money from her. (R.T. 1131:17-24.) He believed that she
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was involved in the deal because on the previous day she had asked Oveicash if he wanted
to take the ATM card and go get money out as opposed to going all the way out to Costa
Mesa, (R.T. 1132:4-9.) When Ms. B. refused to pay. Balcom asked her to give him her
AIM card, and when she refused, he took it from her purse. After telling hff he needed
"coUatcral" for the payment, he took a camera from her dresser. (R.T. 1133:8-19.) Ms. B.
started screaming and threw the camera at him. (R.T. 1133:22-25.) Scared and upset by her
reaction, he tied her arms and legs with some belts. (R.T. 1134:1-4.) When Ms. B. threatened
to scream rape, he proceeded to use bandaimas to gag her mouth. He left her apartment with
her ATM card, camera, and car keys, (R.T. 1134:12-26; 1135:1-15.)
A number of witnesses corroborated the defendant’s story. Mary Vivian Ray. a
security guard at the Woodsidc Village Complex where Ms. B. lived, testified that she had
seen Balcom on the premises of the complex sometime during June or early July. (R.T.
1042:16-22; 1045:4-12.) She testified that on one occasion she had stopped him. requested
identification, and followed him. She observed him enter Ms. B. and Ovcrcash’s apartment
(R.T. 1045:14-26; 1046:1-24.) Ray also testified that she observed Balcom on the premises a
few days later with another black man. (R.T. 1047:9-16.)
Saeid Hariri, the Woodsidc complex manager, testified that he had seen Ms. B. and
Balcom together on several occasions. (R.T. 1075:7-12.) He testified that Ms. B*s demeanor
a few days after the alleged rape was very calm and collected. (R.T. 1072:17.) When Ms. B.
applied for a new key, Hariri asked her how the person who stole her car key found her
parking space, and he testified that she "ignored" his question and acted as if "she was trying
not to give information." (R.T. 1072:7-15.) Hariri admitted that Ms. B. sued his apartment

complex in a civil suit stemming from the incident (R.T. 1081:1-2.) In addition. Leonard
Greco. Ms. B,*s boyfriend at the time of the incident testified that the morning after the
incident, Ms. B. had come to his apartment and told him that two men assaulted her the
pf^ious night (R.T 1244:20-25.) He testified that Ms. B. told him that sh^had taken the
two assailants out to her car after the incident (R.T. 1245:4-14.)
The Prosecution*s Case
Ms, B. claims that she had never seen Balcom before the day of the alleged rape. On
July 23, 1988, Ms. B. was reclining on a couch, watching television late at night alone in her
apartment (R.T. 762:16-22.) At about IdX) A.M. she claims a man knocked on her door
looking for a person named "Mike.” (R,T. 764:14-16.) Shortly thereafter, there was another
knock on the door. Instead of answering the door, she went to the patio and peeked over the
fence. (R.T. 766:8-10.) She claimed that Balcom stood there.
According to Ms. B.. Balcom ran and "catapulted over" the 5-foot 5-inch fence with
one hand, while he was carrying a rifle in his other hand. (R.T. 773:8-11.) She testified that
he asked her for her purse and money. She followed his instructions to get her wallet and her
ATM card and to give him her PIN number. She claimed that he threatened, "If I find out
that this is the wrong number m come back and loll you." (R.T. 780:11-23.) Balcom
allegedly led her to the bedroom at gunpoint, tied her wrists, gagged her and proceeded to
rape her. (R,T. 779-783.) She claimed that she complied because she was scared and that
Balcom was holding the rifle during the entire process. (R.T, 783:9-11; 844:21-26.) After he
forced her to have sex. she claims that she told him where her car was located. Balcom then
left, taking an orange towel, carrying the camera, wallet, and a glass jar full of quarters. (R.T.
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787:18-26; 788:1-5.)
Ms. B. admitted that she had taken several acting classes to get her degree. (R.T.
836:10-13.) She testified that Overcash had a drug problem. (R.T. 886:8-16.) She also
admitted that she had filed a half million dollar lawsuit against the apartment complex and
admitted that she had to prove she was raped in order to establish liability. (R.T. 909:5-26;
910:1-5.) In addition, Ms. B. gave conflicting accounts of the events immediately prior to the
rape. Whereas she testified at trial that Balcom tied her hands first, she had earlier told a
police officer that Balcom gagged her ffrst. (R.T. 861:5-11.) Additionally. Ms. B. had earlier
stated that Balcom took her keys prior to the sex act, but she testified at trial that he took the
keys afterwards. (R.T. 858:14-26; 859:1-11.)
Michael Baker, a resident at the Woodside complex, testified that he saw a black man
near Ms. B.’s apartment between 1:00 and 2:00 A.M. (R.T. 1011:23-25.) He testified that the
man leaving the area was carrying a long object wrapped in an orange towel. (R.T. 1012:412.) The man he saw was wearing a sweatshirt, jeans, and a baseball cap. (R.T. 1011:14-22.)
However, he did not see this man carrying a camera or a glass jar full of quarters and
admitted that he never saw a rifle. (R.T. 1019:12-19; 1021:1.) He also admitted that he
would not have considered this man "suspicious" if the apartment security had not told him
that a girl had just been raped. (R.T. 1020:15-20; 1021:26; 1022:1-4.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This brief will show that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of the Michigan
rape for three reasons. First, the trial court committed a legal error by holding that intent is
always an issue in forcible rape. (R.T. 678: 20-25.) The rule in California is and should be
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that a rape defendant's intent is not an issue when the defendant admits engaging in
intercourse and only pleads that the prosecuting witness actually consented, as was the case
here. The trial court cironeously held that intent was a material issue. As a matter of law,
thc-defendant s intent was not an issue, and the evidence should not have been admitted to
address it
Second, assuming arguendo that intent was an issue, the evidence of the ^4ichigan
rape was irrelevant as a matter of law because it did not tend to prove the defendant’s intent
in the instant case. The circumstances of the Michigan rape arc not sufficiently similar to this
case to prove the defendant’s intent by direct inference. Moreover, dicre is no direct
relationship between the two events. They involve different people and occur in different
places at different times under completely different circumstances.
Third, the evidence should have been excluded because its probative value docs not
substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect Because evidence of uncharged crimes is
inherently prejudicial, the probative value must substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect
for it to be admissible. Here, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence:
Finally, admission of the Michigan rape constituted reversible error because it was
reasonably probable that without the evidence of the Michigan rape the jury would have
rendered a verdict favorable to the defendant Hie evidence corroborating the defendant’s
testimony was strong. Moreover, the jury in the first trial, which considered substantially the
same evidence presented in the second trial except the Michigan rape, did not convict the
defendant

7

ARGUMENT
I.

THE MICHIGAN RAPE CONVICTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED
FROM THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT DID NOT GO TO PROVE ANY
MATERIAL FACT AT ISSUE, BUT WENT SOLELY TO PROVE THE
_DEFENDANT’S DISPOSITION TO COMMIT RAPE.
_
Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible when it is offered solely to prove the

defendant’s criminal disposition to commit the charged crime. Sec, e.e.. People v. Kellev. 66
Cal.2d 232, 238 (1967); Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a) (West 1989).** However, evidence of
other crimes may be admitted for the limited purpose of proving a material fact such as
identity, motive, opportunity or intent Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b) (West 1989).* The
material fact for which the evidence is admitted to prove must actually be in dispute. People
V.

Thompson. 27 Cal.3d 303, 315 (1980). If an accused has not actually placed that material

fact in issue, evidence of uncharged offenses generally may not be admitted to prove it Id.:
People

V.

Thomas. 20 Cal.3d 457, 467 (1978). In the case at bar, the trial court erroneously

admitted the Michigan rape to address the defendant’s "intent" because the defendant’s intent
was not a material fact in issue.
A.

The Michigan rape should not have been admitted to address the defendant’s
intent because intent is not an issue in a charge of forcible rape when the
defendant admits engaging in intercourse with the prosccutine witness and only

' ■ [EJvidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her
character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her
conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct
on a specified occasion,- Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a) (West 1989).
*
Evidence that a person committed a prior crime is
admissible when relevant to prove some fact such as motive, intent,
preparation, plan, Icnowledge, identity, absence of mistake or
accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful
sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the
victim consented. Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b) (West 1989).
8

raises actual consent as a defense.
This Court authorized the rule that a defendant’s intent in a charge of forcible rape is
not an issue when the defendant admits engaging in intercourse and only raises actual consent
as a-defensc. People v. Tassell. 36 CaL3d 77, 88 n.7 (1984). The dcfcndanl-in Tassell was
charged with rape, and he contended that the alleged victim unequivocally consented to
intercourse. Id This Court stated that any evidence of the defendant’s prior rape convictions
could not be admitted to address the defendant’s intent because it was not ambiguous. Id
"Whichever version of the facts is believed, [the] defendant intended intercourse. On his
evidence, [the prosecuting witness] unmistakably consented On hers, he accomplished the
intended act against her will by use of force and threats." Id (emphasis added). This CTouit
added that the prior offenses were not admissible to negate a mistaken but reasonable belief
that the prosecuting witness consented since no such defense was ever suggested Id
This rule was applied under circumstances indistinguishable from our case in People v.
153 Cal.App.3d 888 (1984), and People v. Bmce. 208 CaLApp.3d 1099 (1989). In
the defendant was charged with rape and pleaded actual consent as a defense. Key. 153
Cal.App.3d at 892. The court held that the consent defense does not place the subjective,
general intent of the defendant at issue because the defendant’s intent is not an element of the
corpus delicti of forcible rape. ^ at 895. On the contrary, this defense only disputes the
state of mind of the prosecuting witness, and the prosecution in such a case need only prove
that the alleged victim did not consent Id If the prosecuting witness consented, no forcible
rape occurred even if the defendant intended to rape. Id at 898.
Similarly in Bruce, the defendant in a rape case raised the defense of actual consent
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after stipulating to having intercourse with the alleged victim and specifically did not raise the
reasonable good faith belief in consent defense. Bruce. 208 Cal.App.3d at 1103. The court
held that evidence of prior conduct could not be admitted to prove intent because the
defendant's intent was not at issue,

at 1105-6. The defendant presented na evidence of

his state of mind, but, instead, challenged the alleged victim’s credibility. Id.
"[Defendant] argued that [the alleged victim] actually consente4 not that he believed
that she consented. Without any evidence supporting a Mavberrv defense [reasonable
good faith belief in consent] and absent any attempt by [the defendant] to put this
defense before the jury, the issue of whether he reasonably and in good faith believed
that [the alleged victim] consented to intercourse was not at issue at trial."
Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore, the only ultimate fact the defendant placed in issue at
trial was whether the prosecuting witness actually consented, and evidence of a prior rape has
no tendency to prove whether or not the prosecuting witness in the present case consented.
Id
From the language the courts used in Tassell. Key and Bruce, the "intended act" in
rape is sexual intercourse. To constitute a violation of California Penal Code section 261 the
act must be done with force or fear and against the will of the victim. If the defendant
admits to having intercourse, then his intent is unequivocal and is no longer an issue. If the
defendant contends that the alleged victim actually and unmistakably consented to intercourse,
then the only issue is whether the intercourse was consensual or against the victim’s will.
This issue focuses solely on the prosecuting witness’ mental state. The defendant's intent
ceases to be an issue, and, therefore, evidence of prior acts is inadmissible to address it
Applying the law to our case mandates the conclusion that the defendant’s "intent"
was not an issue and that evidence of the Michigan rape was inadmissible to address it As

10
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in Key and Bruce, the defendant in the instant case admitted to engaging in intercourse and
only raised consent as a defense. Thus, his intent to engage in the act of intercourse was
unequivocal and unambiguous. It was not a material issue. Evidence of prior crimes or the
MTchigan rape could not be admitted under Cal. Evid. Code section 1101(15) to address it. By
only raising the defense of actual consent, the only material fact the defendant placed in issue
was whether the prosecuting witness actually consented to intercourse. The conduct of
another rape victim is not probative of this prosecuting witness* conduct
1.

This rule is consistent with the manner in which this Court has viewed rape.

In Kelley, this Court said, "It is not and should not be the law ... that [a] defendant's
not guilty plea places his intent in issue so that proof of sex offenses with others is always
admissible." Kelley. 66 Cal.2d at 242 (emphasis in original). This Court stated,
[If the acts committed] indisputably show an evil intent and the defendant does not
specifically raise the issue of intent, the better reasoned cases hold that evidence of
other crimes is admissible only when they were performed with the prosecuting
witness (citations) or . .. [when they go to show] a common scheme or plan.
Id at 243.
Respondent’s position lies in direct contradiction to this Court’s perspective of rape.
Respondent argues that merely because the defendant pleaded not guilty to forcible rape and
because he contended that Ms. B. actually consented to intercourse, the defendants’ mental
state is automatically at issue. Under this logic, every time a rape defendant pleads not
guilty, his intent would be at issue, and prior crimes would automatically be admissible to
address his intent. Kelley explicitly asserts that this should not be the law.
Secondly, rape is a general intent crime. See, e.g.. People v. Guthreau. 102
Cal.App.3d 436, 443 (1980); People v. Butcher. 174 Cal.App.2d 722 (1959), Thus, the
11

speciHc intent to commit rape or have intercourse against the will of the victim is not an
clement of the crime. The law does not require the prosecution to prove any specific mental
clement to establish rape. Although the general intent to do the unlawful act must be
established to convict a defendant of rape, the prosecution need not introduce additional
evidence, such as the Michigan rape, to prove that die defendant possessed that general intent
to commit rape. Like all other general intent crimes, the jury can infer the general intent to
commit rape from the act itself.
The Respondent’s argument converts rape from a general intent crime to a specific
intent crime. If a rape defendant’s intent is always an issue when he pleads not guilty as
Respondent suggests, then in each case the prosecution would need to prove that the
defendant had the intent to engage in sexual intercourse with force or fear against the will of
the victim. Intent would become part of the corpus delicti of rape. This position contradicts
hundreds of years of jurisprudence.
The rule regarding rape as a general intent crime works to the advantage of the
prosecution by making rape easier to prove. Not only docs the prosecution need not admit
evidence to prove the defendant’s intent, but the defendant cannot raise certain defenses such
as intoxication as a defense to negate intent See, e.e.. People v. Bishop. 132 Cal^pp.3d
717, 722 (1982) (holding that rape is a general intent crime and voluntary intoxication is not
a defense). Adopting the Respondent’s argument would make "intent" a part of the corpus
delicti of rape and, thus, make rape harder to prove in general.
2.

Sound public policy supports the rule that evidence of prior crimes is
inadmissible to address the defendant’s intent in a rape charge when the
defendant admits enEaging in intercourse and only raises actual consent as a
defense.
12

A rule excluding prior convictions helps prevent a person not guilty of the charge
before him from being improperly found guilty. People v. Fries. 24 Cal.3d 222, 231*32
(1979). Innocent defendants suffer when evidence of similar past crimes are admitted
because this evidence inevitably persuades a jury that the defendant must be guilty of the
crime charged because he has been guilty of such crimes in the past Id at 232. There is
grave danger that the jury vrill decide that because of prior convictions, the accused "ought to
be put away without too much concern with the present guilt" McCormick, Evidence 5 43
(2d ed. 1972). Furthermore, in comparison to the grave danger of prejudice to the accused,
the inference to the charged crime established by prior crimes is insubstantial. People v.
Thompson. 27 Cal.3d 303, 317 (1980). Finally, this kind of evidence produces an "over
strong" tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a person
likely to do such acts. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 194 (3rd cd. 1940).
Concerns such as these prompted the United States Supreme Court to assert that
evidence of prior convictions "is said to weigh too much with the jury and to overpersuade
them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend
against a particular charge." Michelson v. United States. 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). In sum,
the amount of unfair prejudice this kind of evidence creates is so severe that it should be
admitted only under narrow circumstances, not every time a defendant pleads not guilty.
Adopting the Respondent’s position would obviate the policy supporting this rule. Under
the Respondent’s theory, every time a rape defendant pleads not guilty his intent would be at
issue and evidence of a prior rape would be admissible. In virtually every rape case, prior
rape convictions would be admissible. The defendant who stands innocent before proven
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guilty would lose the protection this rule attempts to guard and would be subject to the
extreme danger of unfair prejudice in the minds of the jurors.
The Tassell. Key and Bruce rationale is more fair because it allows evidence of
uncharged rapes to be admitted to address intent only when it is actually at issue. The
defendant only places the onus on his mental state when he asserts that he "reasonably
believed" that the prosecuting witness consented, though she may not actually have consented.
Uncharged crimes would then be admissible to address the defendant's intent Where the
defendant pleads that the prosecuting witness actually consented, the onus is placed on the
prosecution to prove that the prosecuting witness did not actually consent In such a case,
evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes would be irrelevant because it addresses neither the
prosecuting witness's credibility nor her state of mind. It would only go to show the
defendant's disposition in violation of Cal. Evid, Code section 1101(a).
B.

Evidence of the Michigan rape should not have been admitted to address the
reasonable good faith belief in consent defense because that defense was
inelevant in the instant case.

The defense of actual consent is distinct from the defense of reasonable, good faith
belief in consent A defendant who raises consent as a defense does not necessarily assert a
second defense of reasonable good faith belief in consent [hereinafter Mavberrv defense].
Bnic^ 208 Cal.App.3d at 1104; People v. Burnham. 176 CaLApp.3d 1134, 1147 (1986);
People v. Romero 171 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155 (1985). When the defendant claims that die
prosecuting witness consented, the jury must weigh the evidence and determine which party is
telling the truth. Romero. 171 Cal.App.3d at 1155. In contrast, the Mavberrv defense
permits the jury to conclude that both the prosecuting witness and the accused are telling the
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truth; it allows the defendant to claim that he reasonably believed that the prosecuting witness
consented to intercourse because he operated under a mistake of fact resulting from equivocal
behavior on the prosecuting witness* behalf. People v. Mavberrv. 15 CaL3d 143, 153-58
(1975):

~

The Mavberrv defense requires a mistake of fact and cannot not be raised without
substantial evidence supporting it People v. Rhoades. 193 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1368 (1987);
Burnham. 276 Cal.App.3d at 1146-47. There must be substantial evidence from which the
jurors could conclude that the defendant acted under a mistake of fact that created a
reasonable belief that the prosecuting witness consented. Rhoades. 193 Cal.App.3d at 1368.
In addition, substantial evidence of equivocal conduct on behalf of the prosecuting witness is
necessary.. Romero. 171 CIal.App.3d at 1149. Moreover, doubts as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to warrant giving jury instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused.
People

V.

Flannel. 25 C^3d 668, 685 (1979).

In the instant case, the defendant did not raise the Mavberrv defense, and it should not
have been an issue for two reasons.^ Since under Bruce and Romero this defense is distinct
from the defense of actual consent, the defendant was not obligated to raise it First mistake
of fact is an affirmative defense. Mavberrv. 15 CaL3d at 157. It is not a component of a

^ A trial court's duty to instruct sua sponte on a particular
defense arises only if it appears that the defendant is relying on
such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of
such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the
defendant's theory of the case. People v. Sedeno. 10 Cal.3d 703,
716 (1974) .
There was no duty to instruct sua sponte on the
Mavberrv defense in the instant case because there was no evidence
supporting this defense, the defendant did not rely on it, and it
was inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case, which was
that the prosecuting witness actually consented.
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prima facia case of rape, and the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the defendant
did not have a mistake of fact to establish rape. If the defendant does not raise this defense,
then it is not an issue. The defendant in our case specifically wished not to raise the
Mayberry defense. (R.T. 677:3-10.) The prosecution cannot admit evidence of uncharged
crimes to negate an affirmative defense that is not raised.^
Respondent's argument proposes a bootstrap operation. Respondent is attempting to
force the defendant to raise a defense so as to allow admission of highly prejudicial evidence
to negate that defense. The Mayberry defense was designed to benefit and protect a rape
defendant when the prosecuting witness engaged in equivocal behavior that could have been
interpreted by the defendant as consent The prosecution should not be allowed to force the
defendant to plead this defense in order to place the defendant's intent at issue and, thus,
allow the uncharged crime to be admitted. By forcing the defendant to raise a defense, the
prosecution is interfering with the defendant's right to control his own defense, violating
fundamental notions of fairness.
Second, under Romero and Rhoades, the Mayberry defense could not have been raised
in the instant case. In a rape case, when the defendant and the prosecuting witness’ versions
of the events are completely incompatible, there is no "gray" area from which a jury could
infer the defendant had a reasonable good faith belief in consent Rhoades. 193 Cal.App.3d

Thus, our case can be distinguished from Mavberrv and
Burnham. ^
In those cases,
the defendants requested that
instructions on the Mavberrv defense be given to the jury.
Mavberrv, 15 Cal.3d at 153; Burnham 176 Cal.App,3d at 1139.
In
those cases, the defense, not the prosecution, raised mistake of
fact as an issue. The prosecution could have admitted evidence to
negate that defense.
*
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at 1367. Here, the defendant and the prosecuting witness proffered two con^Ietely
incompatible versions of the events. According to the defendant, he was invited in to Ac
apartment, and Ms. B. unequivocally agreed to have intercourse. According to Ms. B., Ae
defendant entered Ae apartment and forced her to have sex at gunpoint The stories arc
irreconcilable and cannot be harmonized.^ The jury could only have chided Aat Ac
mtcrcoursc was ciAer completely consensual or was forced at gunpoint There is neiAcr any
"gray area" nor any substantial evidence inAcating equivocal conduct from which Ac jury
could infer Aat Ac defendant in good faiA reasonably believed Aat Ae prosecuting witness
consented. Since any doubt regarding Ac sufficiency of evidence Aould be decided in favor
of Ac accused, this Court should hold Aat Acre is insufficient evidence to raise this defense.
C.

The Michigan rape evidence could not have been admitted to prove common
scheme or plan or modus operand because Ae defendant's identity was not an
issue.

This Court held Aat nciAer "common scheme or plan" nor "modus operand" is
relevant unless Ac identity of Ac defendant is an issue. Tasscll. 36 Cal.3d at 89. In Tassell.
Ac defendant, charged wiA rape, admitted engaging in intercourse wiA Ae prosecuting
wimess, but contended Aat Ac victim willingly consented. ^ at 80. The trial court admitted
evidence of two prior sex offenses to show "common design or plan" and to "corroborate" Ac
alleged victim's testimony. Id at 82. This Court held Aat this ruling was erroneous since
Ae defendant’s identity was not an issue. Id
Prior to Tassell. a line of cases held Aat evidence of prior sex crimes by Ac defendant

® Unless the evidence reveals some wav to harmonize the
conflicting accounts of the events given by the defendant and the
prosecuting witness, the court need not instruct the jury with the
Mayberry defense. Rhoades. 193 Cal.App.3d at 1369.
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is admissible in a sex case to corroborate the prosecuting witness* testimony, although the
evidence does not necessarily address a material issue such as intent or identity. See, e.g..
People

V.

Kazee, 47 Cal.App.3d 593 (1975); People v Covert. 249 Cal.App.2d 81, 88 (1967).

However, another line of cases held that evidence of prior crimes to establish modus operandi
and common scheme or plan are admissible if identity is an issue. People v. Sam. 71 Cal.2d
194 (1969); People v. Haston. 69 Cal.2d 233 (1968).
This Court rejected the corroboration theory. Tassell. 36 Cal.3d at 89. Unless identity
or a "grand scheme" is an issue, allowing prior crimes into evidence under the label of
"common plan or scheme" is in reality "bestowing a respectable label on a disreputable basis
for admissibility, the defendant’s disposition."* Id at 84. What die "corroboration" theory
conveys is that if the defendant acted a certain way in the past, then that prior act is evidence
that he acted the same way in the instant case. This is exactly the use of prior crimes that
Cal. Evid Code section 1101(a) prohibits. In the case at bar, admitting the evidence under
"common scheme or plan" would be tantamount to admitting the evidence of the defendant’s
disposition to prove his conduct Without evidence of a "grand scheme," "common scheme or
plan" in the instant case is a euphemism for criminal disposition.
Moreover, the extremely unfair prejudice associated with this kind of evidence and the
potential danger of it being used to prove a defendant’s disposition far outweighs any value of

This Court explains that ■common scheme* is an objective
where a party claims that there is a "single conception or plot" of
which
the
charged
and
uncharged
crimes
are
individual
manifestations; if such a "grand scheme" is at issue, then common
scheme or plan is relevant.
Tassell. 36 Cal.3d at 84.
No
Respondent does
■grand scheme" is involved in the instant case.
not contend that the two alleged rapes were connected.
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"corroborating*' the alleged victim's testimony. Ihe mental state of a past victim reveals
nothing about the present prosecuting wimess. Thus, as a matter of law, this Court rejected
the corroboration theory.
In our case, the identity of the defendant was not an issue. He admitted being in the
prosecuting witness* apartment during the night in question. He does not claim that a
different person committed the charged offense. Thus, the Michigan rape cannot be admitted
into evidence under the rubric of "common scheme or plan."^
n.

THE EVIDENCE OF THE MICHIGAN RAPE IS IRRELEVANT AND SHOULD
HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BECAUSE XT DOES NOT TEND TO PROVE THE
DEFENDANT'S INTENT OR ANY OTHER MATERIAL FACT AT ISSUE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
Admission of evidence of other crimes cannot be justified solely by identifying an

admissible purpose. People v. Guerrero. 16 Cal.3d 719, 724 (1976). On the contrary,
evidence of an uncharged crime to be admissible must tend to cither prove or disprove a
material fact at issue. Thompson. 27 Cal.3d at 315. Even if the defendant's intent was at
issue, the trial court erred by admitting the Michigan rape because the circumstances of the
Michigan rape arc irrelevant to the issues of intent or common scheme or plan involved in
this case.
A.

The evidence docs not tend to prove the defendant's intent or common scheme
or plan because there are insufficient similarities between the two offenses to
create a logical inference that the defendant committed the charged offense.

Although there was some similarity between the two offenses, the degree of similarity

’ The trial court recognized this rule and the logic
supporting it in the instant case.
It said, "fere's . . .
similarities, but those are primarily to establish identity. . . .
If you're using motive, plan, scheme and design, that's to
establish identity." (R.T. 679: 12-15.)
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is not strong enough to establish that the defendant used a common plan and scheme to
commit the charged offense. In order for evidence of other crimes to be relevant to prove a
material fact, the uncharged offense must "logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference"
tend to establish that fact Cal. Evid. Code §§ 210, 600 (West 1966); People v. Schader. 71
Cal.2d 771, 775 (1969). While this Court has noted that evidence of uncharged offenses may
be relevant if "the offenses are not too remote, are similar to the offense charged, and are
committed with persons similar to the prosecuting witness," it cautioned that this standard was
simply a general statement of conditions which must exist prior to determining admissibility
based on relevance. Kelley. 66 Cal.2d at 239.
This Court posited a specific test for relevancy to dctciminc whether to admit evidence
of uncharged crimes to prove an issue in the charged offense. The test is that the uncharged
offense must be sufficiently similar and possesses a high degree of common features with the
act charged to be relevant People v. Cramer. 67 CaL2d 126, 130 (1967).* Furthermore, the
court "must examine the precise elements of similarity between the offenses with respect to
the issue for which the evidence is proffered and satisfy itself that each link of the chain of
inference between the former and latter is reasonably strong." People v. SchadcL 71 Cal.2d
at 764.
In Schader. the defendant placed his intent and motive at issue in a robbery charge.
The prosecution alleged that the defendant’s uncle robbed a grocery store while the defendant,
the accomplice, stood outside with a gun as a lookout Id at 768. Hie defendant claimed

* The court noted that such similarity must be "striking,"
■bizarre,■ and "peculiar" of characteristic behavior to satisfy
this test.
People v. Creighton. 57 Cal.App.3d 314, 323 (1976),
citing Cramer. 67 Cal.2d at 129-130.
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that he was simply standing outside unaware that the co-defendant was inside robbing the
store. Id at 768. The trial court admitted details of a past robbery committed by the
defendant and his uncle to prove intent and motive. Id
This Court held that the prior robbery was relevant to prove the defendant’s intent and
motive because the defendant used the same distinctive technique to commit robbery in the
prior crime a he used in the crime charged Id at 771. In both cases the defendant stood
outside as a lookout while his uncle robbed the store.’ Since the behavior of the two
defendants in both cases was so similar, the prior crime was relevant to prove that the
defendant knew that his uncle was actually robbing the store and that the defendant was not
an innocent bystander.
By contrast, in People v. Guerrero. 16 Cal.3d 719 (1976), this Court applied the test
enunciated in Schader and concluded that evidence of a past rape to prove the defendant’s
intent should have been excluded because it was irrelevant In that case, the defendant was
charged with first-degree murder of a 17-ycar old girl Id. An autopsy of the girl revealed
no possibility of sexual molestation. Id However, the trial court admitted testimony of
another 17-ycar old girl who claimed that the defendant and two friends raped her about 6
weeks earlier to prove the defendant’s intent Id
In determining whether the evidence of the prior rape was relevant, the court

• "In each case, the robbers chose a supermarket as a target;
the defendant worked with a single partner, a relative; the
perpetrators used a stolen car for escape; one partner robbed cash
registers, displaying a loaded pistol which was subsequently
concealed; the other partner, standing by unobtrusively, but armed
with a loaded pistol was available to participate in case of
trouble.* Schader. 71 Cal.2d at 768.
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considered the sum total of the similarities: (1) the use of the same car, (2) the similarity of
the age of the victims; (3) the initial presence of a male friend with defendant, and; (4) the
fact that in both cases the parties were driving, cruising, and drinking in a vehicle. Id at 725.
Despite these similarities, this Court stated that the evidence proffered to show intent was
irrelevant Id at 729. This Court held that these similarities were superficial and so nondistinctive that they did not create any inference that the defendant intended premeditated
murder. Id "It would be possible to list any number of marks common to the charged and
uncharged crimes, each of which is so lacking in distinctiveness diat its presence ... is
wholly lacking in significance.... The sum of zeroes, is always zero." I^ citing Haston.
69 Cal.2d at 246.
Although the evidence in our case meets the threshold test for admissibility, it does
not meet the specific test this Court set forth in Schader. Not only are there few "precise
elements of similarity," but those that exist do not justify any inference that because the
defendant had the intent necessary for rape in the first offense he necessarily had the intent
for rape in the instant case. This case is more analogous to Guerrero. As in Guerrero, the
similarities between the two offenses in our case are superfrcial: the defendant engaged in
sexual activity with both women; the defendant allegedly possessed a firearm; and the
defendant stole the prosecuting witnesses' ATM cards and their cars. Beyond these
superficial similarities, the prosecution cannot adduce any precise elements of similarity.
Even under the prosecuting witness' version of the events, gaping differences exist
between the instant case and the uncharged crime. According to the Michigan rape victim,
the defendant stopped her outside her apartment con^lex to ask for directions. (R.T. 1185:23-
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26; 1186:1-4.) He then used a gun to force his way into her car. (R.T. 1186:25-26.) The
defendant drove the car to a secluded spot where he raped her. (R.T. 1187.) After taking her
money and ATM card, the defendant dropped her off. (R.T. 1192:12-13.)
~The sequence of events as well as the actual details in this case can be distinguished
from the Michigan rape. In the Michigan offense, the defendant used a B6-Gun, but in the
present case Ms. B. testified that the defendant entered her home with a rifle. Unlike the
uncharged offense, the defendant did not ask Ms. B. to peiform any oral sex acts. Moreover,
in' the Michigan case, the sexual acts took place in a car rather than a house. (R.T. 674:9-26.)
The Michigan rape victim testified that she offered to give the defendant her ATM PIN
number in exchange for her freedom. (R.T. 1191:21-26.) In this case, Ms. B. testified that the
defendant asked for the PIN number, which she initially refused, and then relinquished. (R.T.
780:11-18.) In this case, Ms. B. was found gagged and bound, unlike the Michigan rape
victim, who was dropped off.
Qearly, the alleged similarities are few compared to the differences. Unlike Schader.
in which the distinctive and striking plan utilized by the defendant to commit robberies
demonstrated that defendant's intent was not innocent, there are no "striking" similarities in
this case which create a link between defendant's intent in the uncharged and charged offense.
The facts of the Michigan incident arc not sufficiendy similar to give rise to the inference that
the defendant had the intent to rape because it was committed in a different location, with a
completely different person, under different circumstances. Rather, this case is similar to
Guerrero where the list of common facts is wholly insignificant
Although defendant may have possessed the requisite intent for rape in the Michigan
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offense, it docs not follow that because he wore similar clothes and stoic some of Ms. B.’s
possessions he had nonconsensual sex with her. The existence of a few similar circumstances
do not prove intent, but only identity and intent to rob which are not at issue.
In both cases, it is undisputed that the defendant wore a baseball cap and similar type
of clothing and did not pull his pants down all the way when engaging in intercourse. Hiese
facts tend to prove neither intent nor common scheme or plan, but identity through a similar
pattern of dressing and acting. To the extent that the similarities tend to prove common
scheme or plan, the facts are only relevant to address the robbery issue. The fact that the
defendant stole an ATM card and a car in the Michigan offense docs not logically have a
bearing on intent to rape in this case, but is only relevant for creating the inference that
defendant utilized a "common plan" to steal. When these similarities are placed aside, the
remaiiting similarities are outweighed by the divergent circumstances surrounding the sexual
acts in both cases.
B.

Because there is no direct relationship between the prior offense and an
clement of the charged offense, the Michigan rape should have been excluded.

Even if similarities exist between the two offenses, there is no direct relationship
between them to create the inference, that defendant intended to rape the prosecuting witness.
In People v. Daniels, this Court held that past crimes arc admissible to prove an element of
the charged offense where there is a direct relationship between the prior offense and an
clement of the charged offense. People v, Daniels. 52 Cal.3d 815, 857 (1992). citing People
V.

Durham. 70 Cal.2d 171, 186-89 (1979). In Daniels, defendant was convicted of murdering

two police officers. At trial, the prosecution had introduced evidence of defendant's flight
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following a previous bank robbery, including a police pursuit (by the two officers who were
murdered) and the exchange of gunfire which left defendant a paraplegic. This Court
concluded that despite the gap in time between the two cases, "there is a direct relationship
between the police rendering defendant a paraplegic and defendant murdering the two officers
in retribution." Id at 857.
Unlike the situation in Daniels, diere is no direct relationship between the Michigan
rape and the charged offense because the Michigan rape is in no way connected to the
charged crime. In both cases, the defendant intended to and did engage in intercourse. The
key issue in this case is whether the prosecuting witness consented to having sex widi the
defendant Evidence from the Michigan rape does not create any inference that the
intercourse in this case was nonconsensual since the Michigan rape victim’s prior mental state
is not related to Ms. B.’s consent

m.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE ITS
PROBATIVE VALUE WAS GREATLY OUTWEIGHED BY ITS PREJUDICIAL
EFFECT.
California law provides, "The court in its discretion may exclude such evidence when

the probative value is greatly outweighed ... by the probability that its admission will create
substantial danger of undue prejudice." Cal. Evid. Code { 352 (West 1989). Assuming that
the uncharged offense evidence is admissible to prove a disputed issue and is relevant the
trial court must conduct a balancing test and weigh the probative value of the evidence
against the potential danger of undue prejudice to the defendant pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code
section 352. In order to be admissible, evidence of uncharged crimes must have substantial
probative value to offset the substantial prejudicial effect inherent in evidence of uncharged
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offenses. Kelley, 66 Cal.2d at 239; Thompson. 27 CaL3d at 318. If evidence of an
uncharged crime only marginally relates to a disputed issue, then it is not admissible.
^^suming arguendo that the Michigan rape was relevant to our case, the evidence of
the uncharged offense did not have the probative value necessary to overcome prejudice to
the defendant*® In this case, the prosecution did not demonstrate that the evidence of the
uncharged rape was of substantial probative value. As argued above, the similarities are not
strong enough, and there is no direct relationship between the two offenses from which the
trier of fact could logically infer that defendant acted as he did in the uncharged offense.
The prosecution reasons that because the defendant robbed and raped a woman in
Michigan, he is likely to have committed a similar offense under like circumstances.
However, this line of reasoning only tends to prove that the defendant was a "bad" person.
From this intermediate fact, the prosecution concludes, because he is a bad person, he had the
necessary intent in this case to rape Ms. B. This is unacceptable reasoning.
In contrast to the minimally probative value of the evidence, the evidence of the
Michigan rape was highly prejudicial. Evidence of other crimes always involves the risk of
serious prejudice. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 466 (1967); foUowed in Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at
318. Thus, evidence should be received with extreme caution, and if its connection with the
charged crime is not clear, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Kelley. 66
Cal.2d at 239; Thomas. 20 Cal.3d at 466. Furthermore, this kind of evidence should be
closely scrutimzed because it tends to shed light on character disposition, rather than any
ultimate fact I^ Thompson. 27 Cal.3d at 305. As a general policy, this Court has held that

Relevancy is defined as evidence having a tendency to prove
or disprove a disputed fact. Cal. Evid. Code § 210 (West 1966).
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"the risk of convicting the innocent... is sufficiently imminent for us to forego the slight
marginal gain in punishing the guilty." Schader. 71 Cal.2d at 772-73; Thompson. 27 CaL3d
at 317.
This policy of close scrutiny was exercised in People v Sam. 71 Cal.2d at 199. In
Sam, the defendant, after consuming alcohol with friends, became involved in a brawl with a
disruptive neighbor. Id When the neighbor attempted to use a Karate move, defendant used
physical violence to subdue the neighbor. Defendant subsequently rendered a series of sharp
blows and kicks, which resulted in the man's death. During trial, the prosecution was
permitted to introduce evidence of defendant's past acts with friends where he had become
abusive when drunk, kicking and lashing out at them, to show common scheme or plan, and
modus operandi, in opposition to defendant's claim of self-defense.
This Court held that the trial court abused its discretion under Cal. Evid. Code section
352 because the evidence was highly prejudicial and had little probative value. The prior
acts of the defendant's two drunken brawls were not probative of whether defendant actually
used self-defense in the charged offense. ^ at 204. This Court concluded.
If there was a concatenation of events, it was tenuous at best, whereas the prejudicial
effect of the evidence is patent____ By use of this strategm, the prosecution was able
to place before the jury the largely irrelevant but manifestly harmful information that
defendant was a man who often drank to excess and was frequently drunk; that he was
often belligerent and fought with others .... In short, defendant was made to appear
to be an antisocial individual of generally bad character, an immoral person unworthy
of the jury's belief or consideration.
Id at 205.
Similarly, in this case, the prejudicial effect of the Michigan rape was overwhelming
when compared to the tenuous inference it established As in Sam, from the surface
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similarities between the two eases, such as the theft of the ATM card and car and the use of
firearms, the jury could have concluded that the defendant was a violent and bad person, not
worthy of their consideration. Here, the jury was allowed to view the emotional victim, who
testified in vivid detail as to the harmful acts the defendant committed upon her. The net
effect to the jury was to paint a sign on [the defendant] which said ’rapist’." People v.
Holbrook. 43 Cal.App.3d 636. 640-41 (1974). Under these conditions, the trial court clearly
abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of the Michigan rape victim.
IV.

THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE MICHIGAN
RAPE VICTIM CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE IT WAS
REASONABLY PROBABLE THAT WITHOUT SUCH TESTIMONY THE JURY
WOULD HAVE A REACHED A VERDICT FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT.
The California Constitution provides that no judgment shall be set aside unless there

was a miscamage of justice.” A miscarriage of justice should be declared when "[t]hc court.
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, is of the opinion that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error." People v. Watson. 46 Cal.2d 818. 836 (1956). The
appellant need not prove that it is more probable than not or equally possible that he would
have received a favorable result without the error. Rather, the appellant only needs to show
that it is reasonably possible that the outcome would have been different in order to obtain
reversal based on prejudicial error. Id at 837.
This Court has looked at several factors in determining whether or not a more

"No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted, in any
case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper
admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error, unless . . .
the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice." Cal. Const, art. VI, § 13.
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favorable outcome to the defendant would have been reached. First, die strength of the
defendant’s ease without the erroneously admitted evidence is a factor. People v. Guzman. 45
Cal.3d 915 (1988); People v. Coleman. 48 Cal.3d 112, 144 (1989). If the defendant’s
testimony, defense, and evidence arc plausible, then together they may establish a reasonable
probability that the case could have been decided the other way.
Second, in the case of a hung jury in the first trial, similarities between the two trials
may determine whether error is prejudicial when the erroneous inclusion of an uncharged
offense in a second trial results in a conviction. Kelley. 66 Cal.2d at 245. Kelley held that
this admission ’’demonstrates almost to a certainty the prejudicial nature of the erTor." Id^ at
245.
Applying the above factors, a miscarriage of justice has resulted in this case because
it is more than reasonably probable that but for the prejudicial evidence an outcome more
favorable to the defendant would have resulted. First, defense counsel presented evidence
supporting the defendant’s testimony in both trials. Several eyewitnesses who placed the
defendant at the Woodside Complex, prior to die day of the rape buttressed his defense.
Mary Vivian Ray testified that she had seen the defendant on the premises of the complex
during the weeks prior to the alleged rape. (R.T. 1042:16-22.) Additionally, Saeid Hariri
testified that he had seen the defendant and Ms. B. together on the premises. (R.T. 1075:712.) Their stories tended to corroborate the defendant’s story that he had visited the coiiq)lex
twice before the incident with his friend Tate, to visit Overcash.
Defense counsel also provided a motive for Ms. B.’s accusations. Ms. B. admitted
that she needed to prove the rape to succeed in her lawsuit against the apartment complex.
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Additionally, defense counsel clearly raised doubts as to Ms. B.*s credibility by showing the
jury the inconsistencies in her statements given to the police versus her testimony. Thus, but
for the prejudicial testimony of the Michigan rape victim, the jury could have reasonably
concluded that the defendant was not guilty of raping Ms. B. because there was evidence in
his favor, as well as evidence tending to diminish Ms. B.'s credibility.
Furthermore, the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming. In the first
trial in which there was a hung jury, the evidence was substantially the same, except for the
Michigan rape. The evidence without th’e Michigan rape was insufficient on its own to
convince the jury that the defendant raped Ms. B. Thus, the Court can infer that the only
difference which created a diiferent result in the second trial was the erroneous inclusion of
the Michigan rape victim’s testimony.
The only other difference between the two trials was the testimony of Michael Baker,
who alleged that he saw the defendant departing from the apartment complex on the night in
question. Baker’s testimony, however, docs not weaken the probability that a more favorable
outcome would have been reached because the jury could reasonably have concluded that he
was not a credible witness. Baker testified that he saw the defendant departing from the
stairwell with a long object wrapped in an orange towel. (R.T. 1012:23-25.) However, his
description of the defendant clashed with the one given by Ms. B. First, Baker stated that the
defendant was wearing a t*shirt, when the defendant was wearing a sweatshirt Second,
according to the prosecuting witness, the defendant left her apartment carrying a jar full of
coins, her wallet and her camera, yet Mr. Baker stated that he did not see any of these items
on the defendant’s person. (R.T. 1019:12-18.)
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More importantly, defense counsel pointed out these inconsistencies to the jury.
Defense counsel also pointed out that Baker admitted that he had not been suspicious of the
defendant, or surmised that defendant was carrying a gun until he was informed a rape had
been committed. (R.T. 1020:15-20; 1021:26; 1022:1-4.) The defense mitigated the
possibility that the jury might have based even part of tfieir decision on his testimony. Thus,
the jury could have based their decision largely on the Michigan rape victim’s testimony.
Therefore, because the erroneous admission of the evidence resulted in a miscarriage of
justice, the defendant’s conviction should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court below erred as a matter of law by admitting evidence of the Michigan
rape to address the defendant’s intent because neither the defendant’s intent nor common
scheme or plan was a material issue. Moreover, the Michigan rape was irrelevant to prove
the defendant’s intent even if it was a material issue. In addition, the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting this evidence because the probative value of the Michigan rape did
not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect Finally, the trial court's mistake constitutes
reversible error. For these reasons, Petitioner prays this Court to reverse the conviction
below.
Dated:

November 5, 1992.
Respectfully Submitted,

Somnath Chatteijee

Shashikala Bhat
Counsel for Petitioner
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